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Case No. 20100492 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. . . . 
RAMONA.JUMA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2009). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the trooper's traffic stop of Defendant, ensuing investigation for 
illegal drugs, and subsequent search of the vehicle reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The court's underlying factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,100 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P3d 1222. The court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for 
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend, IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a~904 (West Supp. 2010) 
• / - i \ * * * 
(2) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary 
authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying alternately 
flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights, shall: 
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; 
(b) provide as much space as practical to the stationary 
authorized emergency vehicle; and 
(c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized 
emergency vehicle and if practical, with due regard to safety 
and traffic conditions, make a lane change into a lane not 
adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle. 
(3) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary 
tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle that is displaying 
flashing amber lights, shall: 
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and 
(b) provide as much space as practical to the stationary tow 
truck or highway maintenance vehicle. 
(4) * * * 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After police found thirty-three pounds of marijuana in Defendant's rental 
car and cocaine on his person, the State charged him with possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine, both third degree 
felonies. R. 1-5. Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over to 
stand trial on both charges. R.20. He thereafter moved to suppress the evidence 
seized during the traffic stop. R.22-34, 37-43. After holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court denied the motion. R.44-45,65-74. Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Defendant pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute and the cocaine charge was dismissed. R.85-86. In so pleading, 
Defendant reserved his right to appeal the district court's order denying his 
motion to suppress. R.85. Defendant timely appealed. R.89-90. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
The arresting officer in this case was Trooper Nick Bowles, a nine-year 
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol with extensive drug interdiction training 
and experience. See R.107:5-ll,33. On the morning of March 31,2009, Trooper 
Bowles was monitoring freeway traffic while parked in the median of 1-70, 
1
 The facts are based on testimony elicited at the suppression hearing, 
R.107, and preliminary hearing, R.106. See R.107:66-67 (court agreeing to also 
consider preliminary hearing testimony). Citations to the district court's factual 
findings appear parenthetically. 
-3-
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approximately one-quarter of a mile east of the Salina, Utah exit 11.107:5,11,13, 
33-34 (R.66:^|f 1-2). Some 20 feet behind him, on the south side of the eastbound 
lanes, workers from the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) were 
repairing a road sign. R.107:ll-12,35,42-43 (R.66:f 5). A UDOT maintenance 
truck straddled the paved shoulder and the outlying gravel, and three other 
UDOT vehicles were parked off in the dirt. R.107:ll-12,37,42-43,63-65 (R.66:1f5). 
All had their flashing amber lights on. R.107:12,37 (R.70). 
At approximately 9:30 a.m., Trooper Bowles saw a semi-truck and a black 
Chevrolet HHR ("Chevy") with a Nebraska license plate enter the freeway from 
the Salina eastbound entrance ramp. R.106:13-14; R.107:ll-14,18,34,44 (R.66:f3). 
After merging onto the freeway, the Chevy passed the UDOT vehicles without 
either slowing or moving to the left, and then passed the semi-truck. 
R.107:14,34-36 (R.66:^[^[3-4).2 The Chevy remained in the right, outside lane as it 
passed the UDOT vehicles, even though no traffic impeded it from moving over. 
R.107:14 (R.66:^3-4). Believing that the Chevy had violated the law governing 
the passing of "emergency vehicles/7 Trooper Bowles pursued the Chevy and 
made a traffic stop. R.107:ll,15 (R.67:ff5-6). 
2
 The semi-truck also failed to move over or slow down before passing the 
UDOT workers, but Trooper Bowles chose not to stop it, because he is not a 
commercial vehicle officer. R.106:18-l9; R.107:14,36. 
-4-
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As he approached the Chevy, Trooper Bowles saw that it had two 
occupants —a driver and front seat passenger —and noticed that "[t]he entire 
rear portion of the vehicle was consumed with luggage, bags/7 R.107:16-18 
(R.67:f8). He identified the driver as Diamond Flynn and the passenger as 
Defendant. R.106:7; R.107:18 (R.67:f 7-8). Flynn gave the trooper a Michigan 
identification card, and admitted that she did not have a driver's license. R.65; 
R.106:6,20; R.107:17-18 (R.67: |^10). Defendant produced a Kansas driver's license 
and a car rental agreement in his name. R.106:7,20-21; R.107:18,24 (R.67-68:t 10). 
The disparate locations of driver (Michigan), passenger (Kansas), and 
vehicle (Nebraska) "stood out" to Trooper Williams because in his experience, it 
is "common for drug traffickers to have multiple locations," with a driver from 
here, a passenger from [t]here, [and] a car from [elsewjhere." R.107:18-19 
(R.68: |^10). Moreover, both occupants "seemed to be extremely nervous, more 
so than the typical motorist." R.107:17 (R.67:t9). "[T]heir hands were 
trembling" and they "seemed frantic in retrieving their documents." R.107:17 
(R.67:f 9). "The feeling [the trooper] got from them was that they were trying to 
get [him] away from the vehicle." R.106:6; R.107:17. Additionally, Defendant 
asked to exit the Chevy before retrieving his driver's license from his person, an 
atypical request that "furthered [the trooper's] suspicion that they wanted [him] 
away from the vehicle." R.107:17-18,46. 
-5-
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After collecting the relevant documents, Trooper Bowles told Defendant 
that he would need to drive the Chevy. R.106:21~22; R.107:46. Then, as 
Defendant walked around the Chevy to get into the driver's seat, Trooper 
Bowles asked Flynn to join him in his patrol car so he could give her a warning 
citation. R.106:22,26; R.107:19,21. In the patrol car, Trooper Bowles requested 
from dispatch a record and warrants check. R.107:21. While awaiting the 
results, he entered the information necessary for the citation and asked Flynn 
about the couple's travels. R.106:7,24; R.107:19. 
Flynn said they had been on vacation in Reno for five days and stayed in 
several different hotels and casinos on Defendant's players' club membership. 
R.106:8; R.107:20. Based on his experience, Trooper Bowles would have 
expected two vacationers to have three or four bags and perhaps some shopping, 
sacks. R.107:16. But the Chevy had "way more than that" —"it was packed, 
more typical of somebody that's moving, not somebody on vacation." R.107:16 
(see R.67:!8). 
With his suspicions raised, and still waiting to hear back from dispatch, 
Trooper Bowles exited his patrol car and approached Defendant in the Chevy to 
ask him about the couple's travels. R.106:7-8,24; R.107:21. In contrast to Flynn's 
story, Defendant said they had been in San Francisco for three days and stayed 
at a Holiday Inn. R.106:8; R.107:21. Trooper Bowles asked whether they had 
- 6 - • -•'" v V-^/.r:\y: 
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gone anywhere else and Defendant "told [him] that they hadn't/' R.107:21. The 
divergent stories of driver and passenger further raised the trooper's suspicions. 
R.107:21-22,52-53 (R.68:f 11). Those suspicions were heightened by the fact that 
Reno and San Francisco were known to police as drug source cities, and indeed, 
Trooper Bowles had personally found "loads of narcotics coming out of those 
areas." R.107:23,55. (R.68:tll). 
Trooper Bowles returned to his patrol car where dispatch verified that 
Defendant's driver's license was valid, that the Chevy was a valid rental out of 
Kansas due back that evening, and that Defendant had no outstanding arrest 
warrants. R.107:22,53-54. Dispatch also notified Trooper Bowles that Defendant 
had prior drug arrests, which further added to his suspicion. R.106:22-23; 
R.107:22,54 (R.68:|12). In light of the inconsistency in the couple's reported 
travels, Trooper Bowles asked Flynn whether she and Defendant had also gone 
to California. R.107:22. Flynn asked if he meant "on this trip," and when 
Trooper Bowles said, "yes, on this trip," Flynn "kind of hesitated and said yeah, 
we did go out there for a day." R.107:22-23. Trooper Bowles then "clarified 
with her it was only one day, and she agreed with that." R.107:23. 
Thereafter, Trooper Bowles gave Flynn a warning citation, returned all of 
her documents, and asked if she had any questions. R.107:23,55-56 (R.68:^[13). 
Flynn said that she did not and began to exit the patrol car. R.107:23,56. But 
-7-
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before she could walk away, Trooper Bowles asked if he could ask her some 
more questions and she agreed. R.106:27-28; R.107:23,56 (R.68:«fl3). He told 
Flynn that he had "seen some things that were out of the ordinary" and asked 
whether they had any weapons or illegal drugs. R.107:23,56 (R.68:f 14). When 
she denied any wrongdoing, Trooper Bowles asked if he could search the 
Chevy. R.107:23-24 (R.68:f 14). Flynn said that he would have to speak with 
Defendant because he was the person who had rented the vehicle. R.107:23-24 
(R.68:1fl4). 
Trooper Bowles approached Defendant and asked if there were any drugs 
or weapons in the vehicle. R.106:9,28; R.107:56. Defendant said there were not. 
R.106:28; R.107:56. Trooper Bowles then asked for consent to search the car, but 
Defendant refused. R.106:9,28-29; R.107:24,57 (R.68:f 14). At that point, Trooper 
Bowles, a certified canine officer, deployed his drug-detection dog around the 
exterior of the Chevy. R.107:24-28,57-60 (R.68:1J15). Upon doing so, the dog 
"indicated, gave a scratch, a bark on .. . the rear passenger door/' R.107:28,30, 
57; R.106:10 (R.68-69:tl5). Trooper Bowles then searched the Chevy and found 
three bags of marijuana weighing a total of thirty-three pounds — one bag was 
found on the floorboard by the rear passenger door and two more bags were 
found in the Chevy's back storage area. R.106:10; R.107:28-29 (R.69:^ 16). 
-8-
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After finding the marijuana, Trooper Bowles arrested both Defendant and 
Flynn. R.106:31. Later, while booking Defendant into jail, officers found "a user 
amount of cocaine" on his person. R.106:ll. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop must be justified at its 
inception and executed in a reasonable manner. The district court correctly 
concluded that the stop in this case satisfied both requirements. 
Trooper Bowles testified that he stopped the Chevy rented by Defendant 
for failure to change lanes when approaching an emergency vehicle —a 
requirement under section 41-6a-904(2) of the traffic code. That provision, 
however, was inapplicable to the facts in this case because UDOT maintenance 
vehicles are not" authorized emergency vehicles" under the code. But contrary 
to Defendant's claim, the trooper's mistaken belief as to the applicable law is 
irrelevant in determining whether the stop was justified. Under settled 
precedent, a stop is justified, regardless of the officer's subjective intent or 
understanding of the law, so long as the known facts support a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that a law was violated. 
The facts known to Trooper Bowles supported a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the driver of the Chevy in which Defendant was riding violated 
section 41~6a-904(3), governing the approach of stationary, highway 
-9-
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maintenance vehicles. That section requires that upon approaching a highway 
maintenance vehicle with flashing amber lights, a driver must reduce his or her 
speed and provide as much space as practical to the highway maintenance 
vehicle. Trooper Bowles testified that the driver did not appear to slow down, 
and did not even crowd the center line, even though the left lane was clear. 
These facts were sufficient to support the stop. 
The stop was also executed in a reasonable manner. After giving the 
driver a warning and returning her documents, Trooper Bowles requested 
consent to search the car and deployed a drug-detection dog around the exterior 
of the car. These actions extended the traffic stop beyond the time reasonably 
required to fulfill its initial purpose, i.e., to issue a traffic citation. The district 
court below concluded that the extended detention was nevertheless justified 
because the facts learned during the traffic stop supported a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of further illegality. 
On appeal, Defendant recognizes that a stop may be extended if 
supported by reasonable suspicion of further illegality. He then asserts that the 
extended detention in this case was not justified, because it exceeded the scope 
of its original purpose. However, he offers no analysis explaining why the court 
erred in concluding that reasonable suspicion justified the extended detention. 
-10-
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Because Defendant has inadequately briefed this claim, this Court should 
decline to review it. 
Defendant asserts that Trooper Bowles released the driver when he 
returned her documents and gave her a warning citation, and then detained her 
when he asked for consent to search and deployed the drug-detection dog. To 
the extent Defendant claims that this temporary release of the driver 
extinguished any reasonable suspicion of further illegality that arose 
beforehand, his argument fails. A renewed detention, like an extended 
detention, is justified if supported by reasonable suspicion of further illegality 
developed during the course of a lawful stop. 
Finally, Defendant argues that the trooper7 s search of the Chevy following 
the dog's alert for drugs was unlawful because there was no separate exigency 
that justified dispensing with the warrant requirement. However, the case law 
is clear that no exigency, apart from a vehicle's ready mobility, is required to 
justify a warrantless vehicle search under the automobile exception. 
-11-
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ARGUMENT 
THE TROOPER'S TRAFFIC STOP, ENSUING DETENTION, 
AND SUBSEQUENT VEHICLE SEARCH WERE REASONABLE 
The district court ruled that "the initial stop and detention of Defendants 
in this case was lawful" because Trooper Bowles "had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion [that the driver] had committed a traffic violation." R.72,71. The court 
further ruled that "reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity" arose during the course of the stop, "justify[ing] further detention to 
ask about drugs, . . . seek permission to search the vehicle," and "deploy [the] 
narcotics dog." R.72-73. And finally, the court ruled that "[a]fter the dog 
indicated the presence of drugs," there was "sufficient probable cause to search 
the vehicle" under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. R.73-
74. This Court should affirm. 
* * * 
A traffic stop must meet two basic requirements to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment. First, the stop must be "lawful at its inception," Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405,408 (2005), i.e., the officer must "have probable cause or reasonable 
articulable suspicion of [a] traffic violation or other criminal activity," State v. 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, \16, 229 P.3d 650. Second, the stop must be "executed in a 
reasonable manner, Caballes, 543 U.S at 408, i.e., "the detention 'must be 
-12-
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temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
s top / ' ' Baker, 2010 UT 18, f 17 (citation omitted). "If, during the scope of a 
traffic stop, the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, the officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion." Baker, 
2010 UT 18,113. Otherwise, "the officer must allow the seized person to depart 
once the purpose of the stop has concluded." Id. Contrary to Defendant's 
claims, the stop here satisfied these requirements. 
A. The traffic stop was justified at its inception. 
A stop is justified at its inception if "the facts known to the police officer 
at the time" support a "reasonable, articulable suspicion" of legal wrongdoing. 
State v, Applegate, 2008 UT 63, f 17,194 P.3d 925; accord United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266,273 (2002). In this case, the district court correctly concluded that 
the stop was justified because Trooper Bowles "had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion Defendants hadcommitted a traffic violation," to wit, "Section 41-6a-
904(3)," which governs the "approaching and passing [of] highway maintenance 
vehicles." R.71-72. 
1. Trooper Bowies'subjective reason for making the traffic stop 
is irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis. 
Defendant contends that the traffic stop in this case was unlawful because 
Trooper Bowles "mistakenly believed that the UDOT vehicles were emergency 
-13-
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vehicles under the statute/7 requiring an approaching driver "to move over to 
the adjacent unoccupied lane/ ' Aplt. Brf. at 11-12. He argues that "Trooper 
Bowies' mistake was one of law," which, he asserts, "is never objectively 
reasonable." Aplt. Brf. at 12. In support, he cites State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, 
194 P.3d 925, and State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, 988 P.2d 7. See Aplt. Brf. at 
12-14. Those cases, however, support the trial court's ruling. 
Trooper Bowles "stopped the black Chevrolet for failure to move over [to 
the adjacent lane] for an emergency vehicle," R.67:^[6 — a requirement under 
section 41-6a-904(2). It is undisputed that this subsection was not applicable, 
because UDOT maintenance vehicles are not emergency vehicles as defined by 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-102(3) (West. Supp. 2010) (defining 
"authorized emergency vehicles" as "fire department vehicles," "police 
vehicles," and "ambulances").3 The State thus concedes that the reason given by 
Trooper Bowles for making the stop was not justified by the facts. But the law is 
clear that an officer's subjective reason or motive for making a stop is irrelevant 
in determining whether the stop was justified. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 5A7 
3
 Nor did the UDOT vehicles "display[ ] alternately flashing red, red and 
white, or red and blue lights," as required under that provision. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6a-904(2). 
-14-
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U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (holding that "the officer's subjective motivation is 
irrelevant"). 
In Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), officers stopped and questioned 
Alf ord on suspicion that he was impersonating an officer. During the course of 
the stop, they discovered that Alford was recording their conversation. Id. at 
149. Based on their belief that the recording constituted a violation of the state 
privacy act, the officers arrested Alford. Id. As it turned out, the law was settled 
at the time that the privacy act did not prohibit such recordings. Id. at 152. In 
defending a subsequent § 1983 action by Alford, the officers claimed that the 
arrest was nevertheless justified because the facts established probable cause 
that Alford unlawfully impersonated an officer. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected the officers' argument, holding that "the probable-cause 
inquiry is . . . confined to the known facts bearing upon the offense actually 
invoked [by officers] at the time of a r r e s t . . . . " Id. at 153. The Supreme Court 
reversed, "find[nig] no basis in precedent or reason for this limitation. Id. 
The Court in Devenpeck reiterated that" 'the fact that the officer does not 
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the 
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action as long as 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'" Id. at 153 (quoting 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). In other words, the officer's 
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"subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to 
which the known facts provide probable cause/' Id. The arrest is lawful so long 
as the facts known to the officer establish "probable cause to believe that [some] 
criminal offense has been or is being committed." Id. at 152. The officer's "state 
of mind (except for the facts he knows) is irrelevant" to this inquiry. Id. at 153. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Applegate likewise held that an 
officer's state of mind plays no role in assessing the reasonableness of a traffic 
stop. Like Defendant here, Applegate argued that "because [the officer] 
misunderstood the [applicable] laws, he lacked the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to initiate the traffic stop." Applegate, 2008 UT 63, | 18. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected that argument. Relying on Devenpeck, the Court held 
that in examining a traffic stop, "a police officer's subjective intent and thoughts 
are irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry." Applegate, 2008 UT 63, f 17. 
"[A]ll that matters is that [the officer] was able 'to point to specific and 
articulable facts regarding [the defendant's] conduct which, taken together with 
rational inferences, created a reasonable suspicion of a violation of the traffic 
laws." Id. at \ 20 (quoting State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, f 17,988 P.2d 7). 
Defendant characterizes a court's refusal to consider an officer's mistaken 
belief regarding the law as an application of the federal good faith exception, 
and he asserts that a similar exception should not apply under the Utah 
-16-. 
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Constitution. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. This claims fails at the outset because the 
good faith exception concerns the "remedy" of exclusion in cases where the 
court has found a constitutional violation. See Baker, 2010 UT18, Iff 35-40. The 
question in this case is not one of remedy. The question is whether there was a 
constitutional violation in the first place. As discussed below, the stop did not 
violate the constitution, because the facts known to Trooper Bowles supported 
reasonable articulable suspicion of a traffic violation, albeit one not identified by 
him. 
2. The facts known to Trooper Bowles provided reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the driver violated section 41-6a-
904(3), which governs the approach of stationary, highway 
maintenance vehicles. 
Section 41-6a-904(3) provides that "upon approaching a stationary 
. . . highway maintenance vehicle that is displaying flashing amber lights," 
drivers must "(a) reduce the speed of the[ir] vehicle; and (b) provide as much 
space as practical to the stationary . . . highway maintenance vehicle." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-904(3) (West Supp. 2010). Trooper Bowies' testimony 
established that the facts known to him at the time of the stop were more than 
sufficient to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver of 
Defendant's rental vehicle violated this section of the traffic code. R.71-72. 
-17-
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Trooper Bowles testified that on the morning of March 31, 2009, UDOT 
workers were repairing a road sign on 1-70, approximately one-quarter of a mile 
east of the Salina exit. R.107:ll-13,33-35,42-43 (R.66:1f 5). Several UDOT vehicles 
with flashing amber lights were parked to the south of the eastbound lanes, 
including a pickup truck that straddled the paved shoulder and the outlying" 
gravel. R.107:ll-12, 37,42-43,63-65 (R.66:Tf5). Trooper Bowles saw the Chevy 
enter the freeway from the Salina onramp and then watched it "pick[ ] up 
speed," continue east in the right, outside lane, and pass the UDOT vehicles. 
R.107:ll-14,18,34-36„44 (R.66:^3-4). He testified that as it passed them, the 
Ghevy "did not appear" to slow down. R.107:14 (R.70). He also testified that 
despite "ample opportunity to move over," the Chevy remained in the right, 
outside line without crowding the center line or changing lanes, which, in the 
officer's estimation, created an "unsafe" condition. R.107:14-15 (R.66:f f 3-5). 
The foregoing facts were more than sufficient to support the stop. As 
noted, section 41-6a-904(3) requires that approaching vehicles "reduce the[ir] 
speed." Trooper Bowles testified that the Chevy did not appear to do so. 
R.107:14 (R.70). Section 41-6a-904(3) requires that approaching vehicles 
"provide as much space as practical" to the maintenance vehicles. Trooper 
Bowles testified that despite an unoccupied left lane, the Chevy failed to even 
crowd the center line, thereby creating an "unsafe" condition. R.107:14-15 
-18-
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(R.66:f f 3-5). These facts were more than sufficient to justify the trooper's traffic 
stop. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (holding that "[a]n 
observed violation gives the officer 'at the least, probable cause to believe the 
citizen had committed a traffic offense'") (citation omitted). The stop, therefore, 
was justified at its inception, 
B. The stop was executed in a reasonable manner. 
A traffic stop, justified at its inception, must also be "executed in a 
reasonable manner." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. To comply with this requirement, 
the detaining officer must "'diligently pursue[ ] a means of investigation'" that 
is likely to satisfy the purpose of the stop in an expeditious manner. See State v. 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, Tf 28,164 P.3d 397 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 686 (1985)). As a rule, therefore, the ensuing detention must be 
"'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.'" Caballes, 543 U.S. at 419 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
During a routine traffic stop, a police officer " 'may request a driver's 
license and vehicle registration, [and] conduct a [corresponding] computer 
check'" on car.and driver. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990)). The officer may likewise conduct "a warrants 
check . . . so long as the check does not unreasonably extend the time of 
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detention." State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 29, 112 P.3d 507. Additionally, 
"[a]n officer may ask the driver about the purpose and itinerary of [the] trip." 
United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 T?3d 420,431 (5th Cir. 2005), cert, denied, 546 
U.S. 1222 (2006). An officer may also inquire "into matters unrelated to the 
justification of the s t o p , . . . so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend 
the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 (2009). And, of 
course, an officer may issue a citation or warning. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. 
Typically, "the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the 
purpose of the [traffic] stop has concluded." Baker, 2010 UT 18 , f13 . However, 
officers are allowed to "graduate their responses to the demands of [the] 
particular situation." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 ILIO (1983). 
Accordingly, if "reasonable suspicion of a further illegality" arises during the 
lawful course of a stop, the detention may be appropriately extended to 
investigate that illegality. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31, 63 P.3d 650; accord 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, ^ 13 (holding that "[i]f, during the scope of the traffic stop, 
the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the 
officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion"). 
• * * * 
As observed by Defendant in point II of his brief, see Aplt. Brf. at 17, 
Trooper Bowies' request for consent to search and his deployment of the drug-
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detection dog occurred after he had given the driver (Flynn) the warning 
citation. Defendant thus correctly observes that the trooper's actions were not 
justified under Caballes and Baker, which recognize that such unrelated police 
activity without reasonable suspicion is permissible when it ''does not extend 
the detention/7 Aplt. Brf. at 17-19. The State thus agrees that the trooper's 
request for consent and deployment of the dog extended the traffic stop beyond 
the time reasonably required to fulfill its initial purpose, i.e., to issue a traffic 
citation. That, however, does not settle the Fourth Amendment question. 
As Defendant correctly notes, "[a]n officer cannot prolong a driver's 
detention after concluding the purpose of the original stop without [a] 
reasonable belief that the driver was involved in other illegal activity." Aplt. 
Brf. at 19 (citing Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 32). Conversely, therefore, an officer 
may prolong a detention "[i]f, during the scope of the traffic stop, the officer 
forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Baker, 2010 UT 
18, f 13. The district court below ruled that that is what happened here: "After 
considering all the evidence, the Court concludefd] [that] Trooper Bowles had 
reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity," thereby 
justifying continued detention. R.72. 
Defendant's challenge to the district court's reasonable suspicion ruling is 
nominal, at best. He baldly asserts that "once [Trooper] Bowles gave Flynn a 
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written warning citation and the rest of her paperwork, and she started to leave 
the vehicle, [the trooper] had concluded the purpose for the stop, and should 
have allowed [Defendant and Flynn] to leave." Aplt. Brf. at 17. He claims that 
they should have been allowed to leave because the request to search and 
deployment of the drug dog "exceeded the scope of the detention." Aplt. Brf. at 
19-20. This is the sum and substance of Defendant's challenge to the district 
court's reasonable suspicion determination.4 
Under the rules of appellate procedure," [t]he argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
. . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). As recently reiterated by this Court, the rule 
" '[i]mplicitly. . . requires not just bald citation to authority but development of 
that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority.'" Hampton v. 
Professional Title Services, 2010 UT App 294, fl 2, 242 P.3d 796 (quoting State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). Where a party fails to adequately brief 
an issue, this Court may refuse to consider it. Id. 
4
 Defendant concedes the reasonableness of Trooper Bowles' actions 
before he "gave Flynn a written warning citation and the rest of her paperwork, 
and she started to leave the vehicle." Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. 
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In this case, Defendant has cited cases supporting the well-settled 
principle that an extended detention requires reasonable suspicion of further 
illegality. See Aplt. Brf. at 16, 19. However, he has failed to provide any 
" reasoned analysis" explaining why the district court erred in ruling that 
additional reasonable suspicion for investigating criminal activity did in fact 
exist. See Aplt. Brf. at 16-20. He simply presumes that it did not. The district 
court's reasonable suspicion determination was based on the following facts: 
(1) Defendants were both from different states and the car was 
rented in a third state; (2) there was an inordinate amount of 
luggage for two people; (3) Defendants were both unusually 
nervous; (4) Defendants' stories about the course and timetable of 
their travel did not match; and (5) dispatch reported Defendant 
Juma had a criminal history which included drug offenses. 
R.72. Defendant acknowledges these facts, Aplt. Brf. at 15, but makes no effort 
to explain why they did not create reasonable suspicion of further illegality, as 
ruled by the district court. Nor does he cite any authority suggesting that the 
facts do not add up to reasonable suspicion. See Aplt. Brf. at 15-20. This Court 
should thus refuse to consider his challenge. 
Defendant does argue, in point III of his brief, that "Trooper Bowles['] 
own actions in concluding the purpose of the stop would indicate that any 
reasonable articulable suspicion had dissipated, and there was no further 
compelling reason to detain" him and Flynn. Aplt. Brf. at 21-22; see also Aplt. 
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Brf. at 15 (marshaling facts supporting suppression). The State agrees that, 
when the trooper issued a warning citation, the original purpose of the traffic 
stop was completed and the trooper could not further detain the occupants on 
that basis. See State v. Morris, 2009 UT App 181, % 11,214 P.3d 883 (holding that 
"a police detention is no longer justified as soon as the exception initially 
justifying the intrusion is absent"), cert, granted, 221 P.3d 837 (Utah 2009). 
The law is well-settled, however, that" 'further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop7" 
is lawful if the officer has "reasonable suspicion of a further illegality/7 Hansen, 
2002 UT 125, f 31 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990)) 
(brackets in original). As noted, the trial court concluded that "Trooper Bowles 
had reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity/7 thereby 
justifying further detention. R.72. Accordingly, resolution of the initial purpose 
of the stop did not preclude Trooper Bowles from extending the detention to 
"expediently investigate his new suspicion.77 Baker, 2010 UT 18, f 13. 
Defendant characterizes the exchange between Trooper Bowles and Flynn 
as a temporary release from detention (by returning the documents and giving 
her a warning citation), followed by a renewed detention "to inquire about 
drugs[,].. . request a consent search/7 and deploy the drug-detection dog. See 
.24-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Aplt. Brf. at 21-22. To the extent he argues that such a release negates any 
reasonable suspicion developed beforehand, his argument fails. A renewed 
detention, like an extended detention, is justified if supported by reasonable 
suspicion of further illegality developed during the course of a lawful stop. See 
United States v. Fuse, 391 F.3d 924,928-29 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that renewed 
detention to conduct dog sniff following defendant's release from traffic stop 
was supported by reasonable suspicion developed during initial stop), cert 
denied, 544 U.S. 990 (2005); United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,1271 (10th Cir. 
2001) (same), cert, denied, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002). In short, "the termination of a 
traffic stop does not effectively erase the objectively reasonable suspicions 
developed by a police officer during the traffic stop/ ' Fuse, 391 F.3d at 929. 
C. The warrantless vehicle search was justified under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
After the drug-detection dog indicated the presence of drugs in the area of 
the rear passenger door, Trooper Bowles searched the vehicle and found three 
bags of marijuana weighing a total of thirty-three pounds. R.106:10; R.107:28-29 
(R.69:^[16). The district court ruled that "[a]fter the dog indicated the presence 
5
 Defendant reasons that "[i]f [Trooper] Bowles had some new or 
heightened suspicion.. . , he would not have released Flynn." Aplt. Brf. at 21. It 
is questionable, however, that Trooper Bowles ever released Flynn. Bowles 
testified that although he returned the documents and gave Flynn a citation, she 
was not free to leave, because he believed he "had developed reasonable 
suspicion to believe that criminal activity was being [sic] taken place/' R.106:27. 
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of drugs, . . . Trooper Bowles had probable cause not only to continue and 
expand the detention, but to search the vehicle without a warrant." R73. 
Defendant does not challenge the district court's probable cause determination, 
but claims that "there were no exigent circumstances that would demand an 
immediate search of the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant from a 
magistrate." Aplt. Brf. at 24. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
One of the well-established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement is the "automobile exception," which permits a warrantless 
vehicle search "'if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, 
even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.'" Maiyland v. Dyson, 527 
U.S. 465,466-67 (1999) (citation omitted). The automobile exception is "based on 
the automobile's 'ready mobility,' an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to 
obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear." 
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1998) (per curiam) (emphasis added).6 
Accordingly, "[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it 
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the 
vehicle without more!' Id. (emphasis added). In other words, and as repeatedly 
6
 The automobile exception is also justified by "the individual's reduced 
expectation of privacy in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation." 
Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. 
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emphasized by the Supreme Court, "the 'automobile exception' has no separate 
exigency requirement" apart from a vehicle's ready mobility. Dyson, 527 U.S. at 
466; accord Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. 
Defendant cites State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23, f 7,156 P.3d 795, in support of 
his claim that the automobile exception requires a separate exigency under Utah 
case law. See Aplt. Brf. at 25. Duran, however, did not address the warrantless 
search of a vehicle, but of a home, and is thus inapposite. As explained by this 
Court, "Duran . . . did not invalidate such a search under the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement." State ex ret D.A.B., 2009 UT App 169, f 
7, 214 P.3d 878. Consistent with Dyson and Labron, the Court has recognized 
that "[a]n officer may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle "where there is 
[probable cause] and the automobile and its contents are readily mobile." Id. 
In this case, the evidence demonstrates that the Chevy was readily mobile, 
i.e., " [ajbsent the prompt search and seizure, it could readily have been moved 
beyond the reach of the police/' California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,393 (1985). As 
explained in another United States Supreme Court case, the mobility 
requirement of the automobile exception generally applies to "an[y] automobile 
that has been stopped on the road , . . . even after it has been impounded and is 
in police custody." Michigan v.- Thomas, 458 U.S. 259,261 (1982) {per curiam). In 
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other words, ready mobility "does not vanish once the car has been 
immobilized" by police. Id. 
In sum, the district court correctly ruled that "based upon the strong 
indication by the canine in this case, Trooper Bowles had sufficient probable 
cause to search the vehicle" under the automobile exception. R.73-74. Contrary 
to Defendant's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 23-25, no separate exigency was required to 
justify the search.7 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted March 10, 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
7
 Defendant argues that "Utah's Constitution provides greater protection 
from unreasonable search and seizure than does the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution." Aplt. Brf. at 24. However, he fails to explain why 
or how the Utah Constitution provides greater protections under the circum-
stances of this case, nor does he otherwise conduct a separate state constitutional 
analysis. This Court should thus decline to address this matter under the State 
Constitution. State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, % 12,173 P.3d 213 f i n the 
absence of a separate and distinct argument under the Utah Constitution, we 
consider Defendant's claims only under the Federal Constitution"). 
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CLERK 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SEVIER COUNTY 
895 East 300 North, Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (435) 896-2700; Facsimile: (435) 896-8047 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V s . . • . , . . . • ' 
RAMON A. JUMA, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIAMOND K. FLYNN, 
Defendant. 
• • ' - . : " ; ' • • • 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
j SUPPRESS 
Case No. 091600075 
091600076 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
' ' - . • • ' 
On 11 August 2009, Defendant Juma filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. On 28 August 
2009, Defendant Flynn filed a Notice of Joinder in Motion to Suppress, joining Defendant 
Juma's motion. On or about 22 September 2009, Defendant Juma filed Defendant's 
Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Evidence Suppression. 
Also, On 22 September 2009 the Court conducted an evidentiary suppression hearing. On 
rn^inooorto 
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17 November 2009, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. On 6 January 2009, Defendant Juma filed a request to submit for decision. 
This motion is now ready for a decision. 
DECISION 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L On 31 March 2009, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Trooper Nick Bowles, with the Utah 
Highway Patrol was conducting traffic patrol on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. 
2. Trooper Bowles was in the median near mile post 58, approximately one quarter-mile 
east of the Salina on-ramp. 
3. Trooper Bowles observed a black, four-door Chevrolet sedaii enter the freeway behind a 
semi-trailer going eastbound. Both the semi and the black Chevrolet remained in the right 
(outside) lane as they passed several Utah Department of Transportation maintenance 
vehicles on the side of the road. The left (inside) lane was Unoccupied. 
4. Trooper Bowles did not see either vehicle move over in their lane or even crowd the 
center line. 
5. The UDOT crew was on the south side of the freeway approximately a quarter mile past 
the on ramp. The UDOT crew appeared to be replacing a roadside sign. There were 
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several vehicles on the gravel shoulder and one was up on the shoulder, partially on the 
pavement. Trooper Bowles felt it was dangerous to the safety of the UDOT workers for 
the black Chevrolet not to move over as it passed. At that point, Trooper Bowles decided 
to stop the black Chevrolet vehicle. 
6. At both the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing Trooper Bowles testified he 
stopped the black Chevrolet for failure to move over for an emergency vehicle. 
7. Defendant Juma was in the front passenger seat of the black Chevrolet, which he had 
rented, and Defendant Flynn was driving. 
8. As Trooper Bowles approached the black Chevrolet vehicle^ he could see there were only 
two occupants. The luggage compartment of the vehicle was visible as the trooper 
approached and he immediately noticed that the entire rear portion of the vehicle was 
filled with luggage. In Trooper Bowies' experience, the amount of luggage in the vehicle 
was excessive for two people. . 
9. Trooper Bowles made contact with Defendants who seemed unusually nervous and even 
frantic. Their hands were shaking as they retrieved their identifying documents and 
handed them to the trooper. 
10. Trooper Bowles obtained identification for both Defendants which showed the driver, 
Flynn, was from Michigan and the passenger, Juma, was from Kansas. The vehicle was a ^ o 
CD 
CD 
CD 
CD 
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rental and had been rented in Nebraska. Trooper Bowles testified that in his training and 
experience it is common in drug trafficking situations for th£ participants and vehicles to 
all be from different states. 
11. Trooper Bowles then spoke with both defendants separately, Their stories about their 
travel together did not match and this caused Trooper Bowles further concern. 
12. At about this time, Trooper Bowles received information from dispatch indicating 
Defendant Juma had a previous criminal history involving drugs. 
13. Trooper Bowles then gave Flynn a written warning notice, returned her identification 
card and then, as she started to leave, Trooper Bowles asked if he could talk to her a little 
more. Flynn agreed to speak to Trooper Bowles. 
14. Trooper Bowles told Flynn about the things he had noticed during the course of the stop 
that caused him to suspect drugs. He asked if he could search the vehicle. Flynn told 
Trooper Bowles he would have to speak to Mr. Juma because he was the person who 
rented the vehicle. Trooper Bowles then asked Juma for permission to search and Juma 
refused. 
15. At this point, Trooper Bowles decided to deploy his trained canine. At the time, Trooper 
Bowles was a certified canine handler. The dog was also a trained and certified drug 
detection dog. As Trooper Bowles took the dog around Defendants' vehicle, the dog 
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alerted, indicating drugs in the rear of the vehicle, and at the right, rear bumper, then the 
dog more aggressively indicated the presence of drugs by barking and scratching on the 
rear passenger door of the vehicle. 
16. Based on this indication by the canine, Trooper Bowles decided to search the vehicle 
where he discovered marijuana on the floorboard, near the rear passenger door, and in the 
rear of the vehicle. 
ANALYSIS . 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated "United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 550 (U.S. 1980). 
The Court first considers whether there was a seizure and subsequent search. The Court 
concludes there was a seizure because stopping an automobile and the resulting detention is a 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). j 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 157-158 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), held, "the stopping of an automobile is constitutionally justified if the stop is incident to a 
lawful citation for a traffic violation." The central issue in this motion is whether Trooper 
Bowles had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Defendants' vehicle. 
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Defendants argue Trooper Bowles did not have reasonable suspicion to stop them. 
Trooper Bowles stopped their vehicle because it failed to move oveir and change lanes while 
approaching and passing the UDOT crew on the eastbound right shoulder of Interstate 70. 
Defendants argue there is no requirement for the driver of a vehicle to change lanes when 
passing a highway maintenance vehicle. 
The State argues that Defendants' vehicle did not slow down, move over, or change lanes 
and thus Defendant Flynn violated Utah Code Ann. Section 41~6a-904(3), and created a 
dangerous situation for the UDOT crews. However, Trooper Bowles testified at both the 
Preliminary Hearing and the Evidentiary Hearing that he stopped Defendants because they failed 
to move over to the left lane for an emergency vehicle.1 The UDOT vehicles with their amber 
colored lights flashing are not "authorized emergency vehicles."2 The UDOT vehicles with their 
amber lights flashing are governed by Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(3) which states: "The 
operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle 
that is displaying flashing amber lights, shall: (a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and (b) provide 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(2) states: "The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary 
authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights, shall: 
... (c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized emergency vehicle and if practical, with due regard 
to safety and traffic conditions, make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-102 defines "Authorized emergency vehicle" as fire department vehicles; fj>* 
police vehicles; ambulances; and other publicly or privately owned vehicles designated by the commissioner of the CD 
Department of Public Safety. 
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as much space as practical to the stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle." 
In this case, the Court finds Trooper Bowles made a good faith mistake. He testified that 
he stopped Defendants' vehicle for failure to move over for an emergency vehicle. He 
mistakenly thought there had been a violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41 -6a-904(2). 
However, the UDOT vehicles are not "authorized emergency vehicles." Therefore, Section 41-
6a-904(3) applies in this case. Section 41-6a-904(3) does not require motorists to change lanes 
when approaching and passing highway maintenance vehicles. Rather, motorists are only 
required to reduce speed and provide space for the maintenance vehicle. 
In a similar case, State v. Applegate, 194 P.3d 925, 931 (Utah 2008), the Utah Supreme 
Court held, "[an officer's] subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant. Instead, all that 
matters is that [the officer is] able to point to specific and articulable facts regarding [a suspect's] 
conduct which, taken together with rational inferences, created a reasonable suspicion of a 
violation of the traffic laws." See also, State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7 (Ut App 1999). 
In this case, the Court finds that though Trooper Bowles obviously made a mistake about 
the specific traffic law involved, he still had a reasonable articulable suspicion Defendants had 
committed a traffic violation. Trooper Bowles knew Defendant Flynn failed to move over when 
approaching and passing the UDOT crew. Trooper Bowles testified he believed this created a 
dangerous condition and constituted a violation of traffic laws sufficient to make a stop. 
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In other words, the Court finds no evidence to suggest Trooper Bowles stopped 
Defendants for a contrived or improper purpose. Instead, he had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that Defendants had violated a traffic law. His subjective understanding (or 
misunderstanding) of the law is irrelevant. Therefore, the Court finds the initial stop and 
detention of Defendants in this case was lawful. 
The next issue in this case is whether the continued detention and questioning of 
Defendants after termination of the initial traffic stop was justified by additional reasonable 
suspicion. After carefully considering all the evidence, the Court concludes Trooper Bowles had 
reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Though many of the traditional factors which typically lead to a finding of reasonable 
suspicion, such as unusual odor, vehicle alterations or physical indications of impairment, are 
absent in this case, the Court finds the following articulated facts sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion in the totality of the circumstances: (1) Defendants were both from 
different states and the car was rented in a third state; (2) there was an inordinate amount of 
luggage for two people; (3) Defendants were both unusually nervous; (4) Defendants' stories 
about the course and timetable of their travel did not match; and (5) dispatch reported Defendant 
Juma had a criminal history which included drug offenses. 
None of these factors, on their own, is enough for reasonable suspicion. However, 
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viewing them in the totality of the circumstances facing Trooper Bowles at the time of the stop, 
the Court finds they are enough to justify further detention to ask about drugs and to seek 
permission to search the vehicle. The Court finds the resulting detention reasonably related in 
scope to the initial detention. At that point, the Court finds Trooper Bowles also had reasonable 
suspicion to deploy his narcotics dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle. 
The Court finds the additional detention was not unduly leiigthy or unreasonable, nor did 
it occur at an unreasonable place or time. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs, the 
Court finds Trooper Bowles had probable cause not onfy to continue and expand the detention, 
but to search the vehicle without a warrant. 
It is well settled that exposure to a trained canine does not constitute a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not expose non-contraband items that would 
otherwise be hidden from public view. United State v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (U.S. 1983); 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (U.S. 2005). However, once a narcotics dog indicates the 
presence of narcotics, the police have probable cause to conduct a search. United States v. Stone, 
866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir. 1989). 
Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals has held "the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement provides that m[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it 
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE v. JUMA, Case No. 091600075 
STATE v. FLYNN, Case No. 091600076 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion to Suppress 
Page 10 
more.'" State v. Despain, 173 P.3d213, 217 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 
527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999). 
Therefore, the Court concludes that based upon the strong indication by the canine in this 
case, Trooper Bowles had sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle. Accordingly, 
Defendants'Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons listed above, Defendant Juma and Defendant Flynn's Motion to Suppress 
is denied. The Clerk is directed to set this case for a scheduling conference. 
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